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ABSTRACT  
This study uses the agency theory to systematically investigate the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. board size, board independence, duality, board 
meetings, director’s ownership, and audit committee size) and the level of information 
asymmetry in UAE. The multiple regression analysis provides evidence that board size is 
positively related to information asymmetry, while, board independence, board meetings, 
directors’ ownership and audit committee size are negatively related to information 
asymmetry. The findings show that the information asymmetry among the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) companies is high and the implementation of the Code of Corporate 
Governance is more likely to be underdevelopment. 
 





The asymmetry lies in the difference between what the most informed stakeholders know but 
the uninformed stakeholders are not informed about certain information. Information 
asymmetry thus occurs when one or more investors are privy to the firm’s value while the rest 
can only access public information (Brown & Hillegeist, 2007). However, the elimination of 
information asymmetry can be carried out by maximizing the access to information regarding 
the company that is non-standard and also by increasing the information visibility of what the 
company offers the stakeholders.  
In addition, Donato & Tiscini (2009) believed that the corporate governance 
mechanisms (e.g,  board’s characteristics like board size, composition, CEO duality, board 
meetings, multiple directorships and board ownership) may have a role to play to influence the 
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level of  information asymmetry. Effective corporate governance is importance to protect the 
interests of shareholders, customers, suppliers, employees and government by guaranteeing 
that firms are made accountable for their actions (Vinten, 1998). In many countries, the legal 
institutions issued the code of corporate governance in order to protect the shareholders’ 
interest. In 2004, the OECD underlines that corporations need to be run, primordial, in the 
interest of shareholders (OECD 2004). Using corporate governance systems, the company is 
viewed by the stakeholder as a set of expectations akin to a polycentric vision of the corporate 
governance systems which has the company in its center with the stakeholders attempting to 
govern surrounding it (Marcel, Orţan & Otgon, 2010). 
The United Arab Emirates government has played a significant role to protect investors, 
shareholders and other parties. In May 2006, the government of UAE through the Emirates 
Securities and Commodities Authority promulgated the code of corporate governance for listed 
companies and subsequently updated it in 2010. Compliance with the code is mandatory for 
joint stock public companies in the UAE, as well as companies listed on the Abu Dhabi 
Securities Exchange and Dubai Financial Market. This study employs the sample of UAE listed 
companies on Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange and Dubai Financial Market to investigate the 
relationship between corporate governance and information asymmetry due to United Arab 
Emirates is one of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The policy makers in the 
stock exchange of UAE emphasized on the role of the board of directors to ensure that the 
annual financial reports of the company is reliable and disclosure of information which could 
reduce the information asymmetry. Therefore, the issuance of the code of corporate 
governance in UAE could protect the shareholder interest by reducing the information 
asymmetry between the managers and owners. 
To the best of our knowledge, none of studies have directly examined the relationship 
between corporate governance and information asymmetry among UAE listed companies. In 
the Middle East, there is a paucity of research conducted in the context of Arab countries that 
have different settings compared to those of prior studies. The remainder of this paper is 
divided into four sections. The next section of the paper discusses hypothesis development. 
Section 3 presents the methodology, section 4 discusses the empirical findings and 
discussions, and the final section ends with conclusions. 
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Based on the agency theory, the board of directors is a key mechanism in ensuring that the 
agent performs his work to increase the shareholders’ wealth. The board’s role in corporate 
governance is to eradicate or at less decrease information asymmetry (Mnif, 2009). The 
board’s role is to tackle agency problems and to oversee managers. According to Fama and 
Jensen (1983), the principal primarily bestows the responsibility of decision making to the 
agents who are held responsible of using and controlling the economic resources of the firm. 
In many cases, management may not always work for the benefit of the shareholders owing to 
adverse selection and moral hazard arising from information asymmetry. 
Often, the problems which may occur between management and stakeholder are 
arising from asymmetries of information. therefore, agency perspective that board of directors 
should possess some crucial characteristics such as independent members, sufficient size, 
frequent meetings, CEO duality, and board ownership as well as audit committee to perform 
its duties more effectively. 
BOARD SIZE 
In board size case, some studies suggest that a large number of members on the board may 
indicate the existence of a dominant group that could strongly influence the board’s decision. 
Abdullah (2004) argued that larger size of board would result in better monitoring of the 
actions of the company management teams. The benefits of more detailed monitoring that 
large board seem to be outweighed by communication and flexibility (Andres, Azofra & 
Lopez (2005). In contrast, existence of substantial shareholders who are able to nominate 
members to the board should protect his or her interests.  
Therefore, some expect that firms having a great number of members of the board are 
likely to be less diffused of the ownership structure terms and they have lower incentives to 
disclose additional information since the level of conflict of interest is lower. Accordingly, 
controlled firms are expected to disclose less extensive information in their annual reports 
(Al-Twaijry et al., 2002). On the basis of the above discussion implied that the great number 
of member representation in the board may have a negative impact on disclosure practices and 
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thus result in a greater level of information asymmetry. 
Generally, board size has been found to affect the monitoring ability of the board of 
directors. Based on the above argument and empirical evidence provided by the previous 
studies, expected that there is a relationship between the size of the directors’ board and 
information asymmetry in UEA listed companies. Thus, the following hypothesis which is 
stated in a theoretical form is tested in this study: 
H1: Information Asymmetry is related to the number of members on the board. 
BOARD INDEPENDENCE 
The board of director’s independence is also another important aspect of board effectiveness. 
From an agency perspective, Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that chairman independence will 
be more valuable because of their capabilities in checking and monitoring managers and thus 
reducing agency problem. Denis et al. (2010) stated that the number of external directors may 
be affect on information asymmetry. Smaller boards with high proportions of independent 
directors positively signals the credibility of earnings and financial disclosure in the financial 
statements reported to potential investors and hence reducing information asymmetry (Marcel, 
et al., 2010). 
Fama and Jensen (1983) similarly revealed that the board’s effective monitoring is a 
function that is a combination of both external and internal directors serving on the board. 
Christopher (2005) claimed that the independent directors on the board bring value to the 
organization, through the maximizing of responsibility by provisions of self-governing 
judgment and maximizing the business connections for the board and executives and finally 
through moderating the power of the chair or CEO. Consequently, board independence from 
firm management, comprising of non-executive or external directors are expected to provide 
superior advantages to the firm (Judge et al., 2003). 
Accordingly, Al-Twaijri et al. (2002) stated that since most of the chairmen of the 
board are non-executive directors, higher disclosure may be expected. This argument is based 
on the notion that chairman’s independence enhances monitoring quality and hence reduces 
the advantages gained by withholding information, thereby improving the quality of 
disclosures. The following hypothesis which is stated in a theoretical form is tested in this 
International Management Accounting Conference 7  





H2: Information Asymmetry is related to the proportion of independent directors. 
CEO DUALITY 
Duality means the same person undertakes both the roles of CEO and chairman, where the 
chief executive officer (CEO) or managing director is also the chair of the board (Cashen, 
2011). A company can achieve superior performance when the CEO exercises complete 
authority and his role is both unambiguous and unchallenged. In role duality, the chairman of 
the board may decide on a matter that would lead to a conflict of interest. In addition, the 
combines roles can facilitate the CEO’s setting of the board’s agenda and at the same time 
influence if not manipulate the directorship selection (Mallette & Fowler 1992). They 
concluded that the dual role of CEO may challenge the board’s monitoring role. 
To facilitate more effective monitoring and control of the CEO, agency theory 
suggests splitting the board chair position from CEO position.  Moreover, Fama and Jensen 
(1983) claimed that the separation of CEO and chairman’s roles leads to the decrease in 
agency costs as this will allow the chairman to better monitor the CEO. However, even if 
separation of roles’ positive light in agency theory, in certain cases, it may facilitate the 
breakdown of communication between CEO and chairman and lead to greater information 
asymmetry. Based on the above studies, there is a relationship between the separation of 
chairman-CEO roles and information asymmetry. Thus, the following hypothesis which is 
stated in a theoretical form is tested in this study: 
H3: Information Asymmetry is related to the separation of chairman-CEO roles. 
DIRECTOR OWNERSHIP 
Director ownership is considered as the percentage of total firm equity capital (without shares 
attributable to underlying share bonus, incentive and option plans) held by all company 
directors. As known that the directors may disclose information voluntarily if it is aligned 
with their own interests. To this extent, Jensen and Meckling (1976) claimed that additional 
overseeing is needed by ordinary shareholders as managerial ownership has been known to 
decrease and the monitoring is expected to urge the managers to disclose information 
voluntarily. 
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Nevertheless, whenever corporate ownership achieves a specific level, expected to 
allocate the firm’s resources to their interests no matter with the external shareholders. The 
findings from empirical studies indicate consistency with the belief that director’s ownership 
is a way to confine the opportunistic activities of managers.   
On the other hand, when corporate insiders own lower levels of firm’s equity, are 
more inclined to keep their strategies aligned with the other owners’ preferences (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). Both information asymmetries and agency costs differ based on the 
characteristics of the venture capitalist and the entrepreneurial firm and the financing 
arrangement’s structure (Kong et al., 2011). Thus, the following hypothesis which is stated in 
a theoretical form is tested in this study: 
H4: Information Asymmetry is related to the Director Ownership. 
 
BOARD OF DIRECTOR MEETINGS 
 
Board meetings are considered as the time that directors spent monitoring the performance of 
management team (Vafeas, 1999) and also an important source to improve the board members 
effectiveness (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Previous studies show that boards that have frequent 
meetings are more likely to show effectiveness particularly in regards to the process of 
financial reporting.  
To this extent, they argued that diligent boards are more likely to perform their duties 
effectively for the benefit of shareholders.  In line with this Vafeas (1999) also reported that 
board diligence can enhance board effectiveness. Additionally, with regular meetings, 
directors are more likely to obtain all the information regarding the performance of the 
company and to take actions to address company issues (Christozov et al., 2006).  
The board’s monitoring is an important sign of the governance quality as the boards 
that actively monitor their managers have a better possibility of keeping manager’s incentives 
aligned with the shareholder’s interests. Accordingly, board diligence as proxy by the 
frequency of board meetings is expected to lead to effective monitoring and to decreasing 
agency problems stemming from lower information asymmetry through higher disclosure of 
voluntary information (Christozov, et al., 2006). Thus, the following hypothesis which is 
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stated in a theoretical form is tested in this study: 
H5: Information asymmetry is related to the number of board meetings. 
 
AUDIT COMMITTEE SIZE 
An important aspect of the work of an audit committee is to act as an effective intermediary 
between the management of the company and the external auditors. In some cases, the 
manager of the company has an influence on the audit committee and therefore, the audit 
committee does not provide us with important information (Al-Twaijry et al, 2002). Klein 
(2002) revealed that audit committees having strong-CEO also have the inclination to have 
less meetings compared to their counterparts. However, hardworking boards pay greater audit 
fees owing to their higher demands for audit quality and greater assurance of audit work 
requirement, implying that the relationship between board activity and monitoring of financial 
accounting process. 
Similarly, Cormier et al. (2009) stated that audit committee effectiveness key to 
information disclosure and could improve its monitoring role to be carried out more 
effectively. It expected that audit committee size is positively related to disclosure. Hence, 
minimize information asymmetry. Thus, the following hypothesis which is stated in a 
theoretical form is tested in this study: 




This study uses Tobin’s Q as proxy for information asymmetry.  A high Tobin’s Q (i.e. 
measured by the market value of a firm’s equity, plus the book value of its liability, divided 
by the book value of equity and liability at the end of year) implies that there is a variance in 
the demand for shares of the company and consequently result to an increase of information 
asymmetry (Denis et al 2010; Tobin & Brainard 1977). In addition, multiple regression 
analysis is employed to examine the relationships between corporate governance mechanism 
and information asymmetry among UAE listed companies for the year ended 2010.  
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The predictor variables included in this study are described and summarized in Table 
1. 
 







Board of Directors Size BSIZE The total number of directors on the board members 




The percentage of independent members in the board of 
director’s members (value of “1” if the company has more than 




The CEO is also the board chairman measured by “1”, if 
separate the position  of CEO and chairman  measured by “0” 





Percentage of shares that held by director’s members in the 
company 
Audit Committee Size ACSIZE Number of audit committee members 
Firm Size FIMSIZE Log of total Assets 
 
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES 
The descriptive analysis provides evidence that the average of board size (BSIZE) is 8.30 
members with maximum size of 17 and minimum size of 5 members respectively. This result 
implies that the UAE companies in general have a large size board of directors which 
corresponds to the corporate governance code in UAE: “The appropriate number of members 
is determined by the size of the company but a good practice for the small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) would be between five and ten members”. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
suggested that larger (smaller) boards are able to commit more (less) time and effort to 
overseeing management. Therefore, stakeholders should benefit through improved financial 
transparency and reliability due to the board of director’s effectiveness in monitoring the 
financial accounting process. Similarly, Adams and Mehran (2002) indicated that some firms 
require larger boards for effective monitoring like banks and large companies.  
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The mean number of board meetings is 5.8281 implying that the level of board 
meetings of UAE companies is moderate as the minimum number of meetings is 3 and the 
maximum number of meetings is 12. This analysis suggests that UAE companies have 
complied with the code of corporate governance whereby stating that "the directors' board 
should meet at least quarterly or as frequently as necessary for the discharge of its 
obligations." The mean of audit committee size is 3.37 with minimum and maximum of 0 and 
6 members respectively. The analysis implies that most companies in UAE follow the Code of 
Corporate Governance recommendation that at least the audit committee should be 3 
members although one company has no audit committee.  
In addition, the mean of shares held by the board members in UAE companies is 
3.83% with a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 72 percent. The disclosure of 
board members’ shares may provide an indication that UAE Companies communicate with 
their stakeholders to ensure timely and accurate disclosure of information on the company's 
activities. Providing information about the transactions of shareholders and employees imply 
that companies have a high quality of information system.  
In particular, 42 (66%) of the UAE companies have not recorded any shares held by 
the members of board of directors. In addition, the firm size in UAE has a mean value of log 
assets of 6.4244 with a minimum of 4.77 (58,667 AED) and maximum of 8.46 (28,621,588 
AED). Further, the mean percentage of Information Asymmetry among UAE listed 
companies is 0.9276 with the maximum of 2.84 and the minimum of 0.06 respectively while 
the standard deviation of this variable is 0.55152. This statistical analysis provides evidence 
that information asymmetry is likely to be high among UAE companies. 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Information Asymmetry (Tobin Q) 64 0.06 2.84 0.9276 0.55152 
Board size (number) 64 5 17 8.2969 2.16524 
Board meetings (number) 64 3 12 5.8281 1.78668 
Audit Committee Size (number) 64 0 6 3.3750 0.76636 
Firm size (Log) 64 4.77 8.46 6.4244 0.86267 
Director ownership (%) 64 0 72% 3.83% 0.11003 
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Table 3 shows that the independent directors who sit on the board make up 70.3% 
based on the dummy measurement used by the present study. Whereas, a value of 1 is 
assigned to the company that has more than 50% of independent board directors and a value 
of 0 is otherwise. Taking into account, there are 45 companies that are found to have more 
than 50% independent board directors and 19 are found to have less (29.7%), the analysis 
suggests that the director’s boards of UAE companies comprise a high percentage of 
independent directors. This situation may indicate high effectiveness of the board of directors 
of the UAE companies.  





The separation in the position of CEO and the chairman is reported in 60 UAE 
companies to represent 93.8% of sample companies, whereas the CEO duality is documented 
in only 4 companies representing a 6.2% of the sample size. This statistical analysis suggests 
that the agency problems stemming from the conflict of interests may be low in the setting of 
UAE. 
UAE through the Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority has promulgated the 
code of In addition, the first objective which is related to the investigation of the level of 
information asymmetry in UAE companies is provided by descriptive analysis in Table 1. The 
level of information asymmetry in UAE companies seems to be high although the government 
of corporate governance that was updated in 2010. This result perhaps is due to the lack of 
transparency and the production of little information related to the companies. Furthermore, it is 
noteworthy that multicollinearity test and normality test been considered in the present study. 
Variables 
 
Measurements Frequency Percent (%) 
Board independence (0/1) 0 19 29.7 
 1 45 70.3 
Total  64 100 
CEO duality (0/1) 0 60 93.8 
 1 4 6.2 
Total  64 100 
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TABLE 4 Correlation 
        ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
        * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
High correlation between the independent variables is a serious problem in multiple 
regressions given that the difficulty to identify the effect of each independent variable on the 
dependent variable. Nevertheless, a widely used method to detect and measure 
multicollinearity is the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each independent variable (Naser 
et al., 2002). Silver (1997) noted that the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) above 10, the 
independent variables are considered highly correlated. Table 4 shows that no 
multicollinearity problem exists due to the fact that no VIF value exceeds 10 in the present 
study. In addition, the normality of the data is tested by analyzing the skewness and kurtosis. The 
value of Skewness must be less than ±3 and Kurtosis must not be more than ±10 (Kline, 1998) 
in order to achieve a normal data. 







Correlation 1 -.022 -.015   .429** .183 -.006 -.058 .201 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .865 .904 .000 .147 .965 .647 .111 
N  64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
BINDP 
 
Correlation  1 .072 -.129 -.126 -.256* -.093 -.168 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .572 .308 .319 .041 .467 .184 
N   64 64 64 64 64 64 
BMEET 
 
Correlation   1 .071 .169 -.157 -.137 -.061 
Sig. (2-tailed)    .577 .181 .215 .280 .633 
N    64 64 64 64 64 
ACSIZE Correlation    1 .246 .042 -.016 -.157 
Sig. (2-tailed)     .050 .739 .900 .216 
N     64 64 64 64 
FIMSIZE  Correlation     1 .055 -.101 -.268* 
Sig. (2-tailed)      .666 .425 .032 
N      64 64 64 
DUAL 
 
Correlation      1 -.042 -.035 
Sig. (2-tailed)       .742 .782 
N       64 64 
DOWNR 
 
Correlation       1 -.075 
Sig. (2-tailed)        .557 
N        64 
IA  Correlation        1 
Sig. (2-tailed)         
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MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
This section presents an analysis and discussion of the relationship between information 
asymmetry (Tobin’s Q) as a dependent variable and the independent variables (i.e. board size, 
board independence, board meetings, CEO duality, board ownership and audit committee 
size) along with the firm size as a control variable using a multiple regression technique. The 
equation used to explain the relationship is:  
Information Asymmetry = α0 + β1BSIZE + β3BIND + β4DUAL + β5BMEET + β6 BOWNER 
+ β7ACSIZE + FIMSIZE + ε  
 
Where:  
Tobin’s Q:  as a proxy of information asymmetry (IA). 
 α0:              Intercept. 
BSIZE:       Board Size. 
 BIND:       Board Independence. 
 DUAL:      Duality Role. 
BMEET:    Board Meetings. 
DOWNR:   Director Ownership. 
 ACSIZE:   Audit Committee Size. 
FIMSIZE:  Firm Size. 
 ε:                Error term. 
 
TABLE 5 Summary of Regression Model 
 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
0.911 0.829 0.744 0.29442 2.248 
 
Table 5 shows that the adjusted R
2 
is 74.4% which can be explained by the six 
independent variables and control variable. In addition, Durbin-Watson value is 2.248 
indicates that there are no autocorrelation amongst variables. Kazmier (1996) indicated that 
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TABLE 6 Multiple Regression Analysis 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10% 
 
  Table 6 presents the regression results of the relationship between information 
asymmetry and corporate governance characteristics and firm size. Board size, board 
independence, audit committee size, firm size and directors’ ownership, are significantly 
related to information asymmetry.  
The findings show that the relationship between board size and information 
asymmetry is positive and significant at 1% level. The results suggest that the larger size of 
the board of directors may lead to conflict of interest resulting in information asymmetry. In 
other words, large board of directors is unable to monitor the management and protect the 
interest of shareholder. These results are consistent with the agency theory which 
conjunctures that an average board size is not appropriate and is considered ineffective as it 
exceeds eight members (Jensen, 1993).  
Audit committee size has a significant and negative relationship with the information 
asymmetry at 1% level. These results indicate that audit committee is an important monitoring 
mechanism for committee effectiveness. Audit committee should protect the interest of 
shareholders and minimize the information asymmetry level between the management and 
shareholders. The present results are consistent with Denis et al. (2010) who observed that 
audit committee size has a negative and significant relationship with information asymmetry.  
In addition, the multiple regression analysis also shows that the board independence 
has a negative and significant relationship with information asymmetry (Tobin’s Q) at 5% 
Variables 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 2.073 0.676  3.064 0.008 
BSIZE 0.129 0.037 0.619 3.463 0.004*** 
BIND -0.378 0.157 -0.279 -2.417 0.030** 
BMEET  -0.002 0.043 -0.009 -0.057 0.955 
ACSIZE -0.367 0.103 -0.690 -3.560 0.003*** 
FIMSIZE -0.196 0.101 -0.274 -1.949 0.072* 
DUAL 0.308 0.331 0.113 0.930 0.368 
DOWNR -0.418 0.106 -0.577 -3.944 0.001*** 
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level. These results indicate that the outside directors in the board play an important role in 
monitoring the management and in protecting the interest of shareholders. The board 
independence works as a mentoring mechanism to reduce the agency cost among UAE listed 
companies. These findings are in line with Denis et al. (2010) who found a negative 
relationship between board independence and the information asymmetry.  
Similarly, Yee and Zain (2007) found that board directors with an independent 
chairman are significantly and negatively associated with the degree of information 
asymmetry among Malaysian public listed companies. Furthermore, independent outside 
directors have a positive valuation effect under conditions of low information asymmetry in 
Korean companies (Sung & Jin, 2007). In New Zealand, Wilson (2011) found that firms 
facing higher information asymmetry tend to have a smaller and less independent board of 
directors, and the chief executive officer (CEO) is more likely to be included in the board. 
Table 6 also provides evidence that the directors’ ownership in UAE companies is negatively 
and significantly related to information asymmetry at 1% level. This finding is consistent with 
Gerayli et al. (2011) who indicated that board ownership has a negative impact on level of 
information asymmetry which is measured by bid-ask spread. In addition, Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2007) examined the relationship between the quality of corporate governance and 
information asymmetry through share price. They found that the changes in the share price at 
the time of earning announcements are significantly negatively related to the percentage stock 
holdings of directors. 
Moreover, the firm size serves as an effective proxy for information asymmetries. 
Firm size of UAE listed companies is significantly and negatively related to information 
asymmetry at 10% level. In a similar vein, Filbeck and Webb (2001) found that investors 
seem to prefer to invest in larger companies that display greater financial disclosure and less 
information asymmetry.  
Generally, the corporate governance in UAE companies seems to be in need 
developing, may due to many aspects such as the skills and qualifications of directors which 
make a weakness decision and flounder the role of board of directors in monitoring the 
management. In addition, the low effectiveness of the legal and regulatory procedures may 
also a reason for lack of adherence the UAE companies with the corporate governance 
directions. 
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The multiple regression analysis provides evidence that the functions of corporate 
governance may be in need of strengthening. Board of directors and audit committees in UAE 
are also required to monitor the management and protect the shareholders' interests. The UAE 
regulators seem to develop the recommendations of corporate governance code to improve the 
effectiveness of audit committees and the board of directors. Adawi and Rwegasira (2011) 
suggested that the corporate governance in UAE companies have been focused on the 
promotion of practices such as greater disclosure, improved rights of shareholders and 
boardroom reform. Parker (2007) indicated that corporate governance may go beyond the 
compliance with legal responsibilities to cover information of whatever deemed suitable to 
inform stakeholders about the management performance.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This result shows that the level of information asymmetry in UAE is considered high. For 
emerging markets such as the UAE, companies may be concerned about the essential 
indicators of the quality of corporate governance required to build confidence in these 
markets. Adawi and Rwegasira (2011) believed that in order to stand out in the market, 
corporations in general, and listed companies in particular, will need to adopt discretionary 
practices of disclosure in order to attract local and international investors. Typically, the 
practice of corporate governance is tailored to suit the needs of core shareholders, in order to 
gain access to an expanded pool of external investment in equity. The need for improvement 
in the practice of governance and of the rights of shareholders is related to the concerns of 
external investors. 
Multiple regression analysis is used to examine the relationship between information 
asymmetry and corporate governance mechanisms, namely board size, board independence, 
CEO duality, board meetings, director ownership and audit committee size of the UAE listed 
companies. The finding reveals that the relationship between board size, board independence, 
audit committee size and director's ownership with information asymmetry of UAE listed 
companies is significant and negative in direction except board size, which is positive. 
However, the empirical findings of this study indicate that there are no significant relationship 
between the board meeting and CEO duality. 
In addition, the companies in UAE are required to encourage the inclusion of more 
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outside independence directors to the board due to the role they play in monitoring the 
management and minimizing the information asymmetry. The disclosure of board members’ 
shares may indicate that UAE companies have good communication systems with their 
stakeholders to ensure timely, transparent and accurate disclosure of information. The UAE 
companies may have a good quality in regulations and information systems but the 
information seems to be asymmetric. 
This study provides various insights that should be of interest to government, 
shareholders, investors, policymakers and other relevant stakeholders. However, this study is 
facing limitations which hinder the scope and generalization of the results. These limitations 
include, the research design of the study which considers only UAE listed companies and also 
centered only the financial and non-financial companies that disclosed their corporate 
governance reports.  
Secondly, this study has employed only the data for the year ended 2010 and only 
applied the measure (Tobin's Q) as a proxy for information asymmetry. However, other 
measurements that reflect the market phenomenon like bid and ask and share price volatility 
are ignored in the present study. This study examines six characteristics of corporate 
governance (i.e. board size, independence, CEO duality, board meetings, audit committee size 
and director's ownership) and their relationship with information asymmetry. Therefore, the 
future research should include other corporate governance variables and other measurement 
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